Representation and the Profession of Politics in Buenos Aires: The Figure of the Member of the City Council during the 20th Century

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Abstract

In this article, I analyze the relational configurations that, at different times, delimit a particular governmental figure. I use the term “figure” in order to demonstrate the process through which the meaning assigned to a particular term is transformed over time as a result of the modifications of the relational frameworks that condition the objective possibilities of acceding to an office. This approach circumscribes my empirical analysis of the trajectories of members of the City Council of Buenos Aires between 1822 and 1996.

Keywords: Buenos Aires, elites, municipal government representatives, party cadres, political professionalization, political representation.

* Article received on November 14, 2013; final version approved on March 24, 2014. The results set out in this article are part of the project “Elites políticas y campo político en Buenos Aires,” developed as part of the author’s field work at CONICET. It is also part of the UBACyT project “Elites políticas y gobierno en Buenos Aires,” which leads the scientific schedule for 2012-2014. The author is grateful for the valuable comments of the anonymous referees, which were helpful in improving the first draft of this article.

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The characteristics of the individuals who hold elected public office have repeatedly attracted the attention of the social sciences, giving rise to a host of studies on the politicians and technocrats who hold executive or legislative office. In many cases, aggregate analysis of individual data is used to analyze the transformations that permit the description of, for instance, changes to educational, professional, or cultural profiles. Although this kind of analysis is extremely rich, here a complementary approach is proposed that, rather than centering on a detailed description of a group of individuals, focuses on the analysis of relational configurations that delimit a particular government figure at different times. We use the term "figure" to demonstrate the process through which the meaning assigned to a single term is transformed over time as a result of changes in the relational frameworks that condition the objective possibilities of acceding to an office.

This approach circumscribes our empirical analysis of the trajectories of members of the City Council of Buenos Aires between 1822 and 1996. The council members were ever-present for more than a century until they were replaced by city deputies following the process by which Buenos Aires was granted autonomy. However, this continuity goes no further than the name assigned to the group of individuals who sat on the council since very different meanings underlied the term "council member" during the course of the 20th century. Something very different was understood by this job title towards the end of the 19th century in comparison to what it was considered to mean at the close of the 20th. In the former case, it denoted a set of individuals with homogeneous social characteristics who shared common socialization spaces as members of the city's haute bourgeoisie, and who governed "their" city by leaving "politics" to one side. In the latter case, it referred to a relatively heterogeneous group of individuals who came to occupy a space at the fringes of the precarious Argentine party system that, however debased, rendered them part of the political system.

1. The study of political elites has a long tradition in the social sciences, underpinned by the pioneering works of Weber, Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and, subsequently, Mills. An interesting summary of the classic debate can be found in Yannuzzi (1993) and in Genieys (2006). Thereafter, as Sawiki (1999) points out, studies on the characteristics of politicians have occupied a prominent position in English-language academic work since the early decades of the 20th century. Conversely, in France, the first empirical research dates back to as recently as 1950. In Argentina, the first studies on the characteristics of political elites appeared in the 1960s (Cantón 1964; De Imaz 1969), but the country's institutional instability limited the development of the field. In recent years, a series of studies on the varying characteristics of professional politicians have appeared, analyzing the cases of ministers, parliamentarians, and governors (Lascurain 2011; Canelo 2013, 2011; Gené 2009; Ferrari 2005).

2. A variety of sources were utilized: newspaper articles, laws, ordinances, legal discussions, lists of members, etc., supplemented by secondary sources.

3. For a more in-depth analysis of the process by which the government of Buenos Aires acquired autonomy, see Landau (2008, 2014a).
In the western democracies, the transformations of these frameworks are associated with two frequently linked processes: the way in which the representative relationship between the governing and the governed is structured and the professionalization of politics as an occupation. Towards the end of the 19th century, political offices were concentrated in the hands of "notables," members of the social elites who were well-off and enjoyed professional prestige. These individuals occupied their posts on an ad honorem basis, earning their living from private pursuits and not from politics. In addition, there was no need to seek mass support for their candidacies or their governmental decisions since census suffrage existed and electoral fraud was generalized. The nature of the relationship between the governing and the governed at that time can be understood by using the model that Norbert Elias calls the oligarchy game. Here, unlike the simple models where all players are on the same "floor," there is a degree of complexity in the interdependencies between the different individuals or groups in a society that take part in the social "game." This complexity is provided by the existence of "two levels," which results in players "no longer playing directly with one another." The "mass of players" who occupy the first floor are joined by "special functionaries who coordinate the game – representatives, delegates, leaders, governments, royal courts, monopolistic elites and so forth." In the "oligarchy game," these two levels nonetheless have such a power differential that "only the players of the second floor participate directly and actively in the game." As a result, the individual who belongs to the select group on the second floor "may imagine that the course of the game, as he sees it unfold before him, is more or less transparent to him" (Elias 1978: 87). This game configuration was altered at the start of the 20th century as societies became more complex, leading to the formation of modern party systems. Though it maintains two floors or tiers, as in the oligarchy game, the new relationship configuration nonetheless implies a first step towards "democratization," according to the model proposed by Elias (1978: 89-92); this change is evident in the reduction in the power differential between the two tiers, which makes it more difficult for those on the upper tier to act without any consideration of those on the lower level. Thus, "the former gradually become more openly and ambiguously functionaries, spokesmen or representatives of one or other of the lower-level groups" (Elias 1978: 90).

Democratization in the relational configuration led to the formation of modern political fields, which are characterized by a dual process. The first of these is the creation of a relationship of representation and delegation in which the representatives establish themselves as the voice of the represented (Bourdieu 1981; 1988). In order for this relationship to work, politicians must base their legitimacy on the achievement of what Pierre Bourdieu called the "oracle effect" (1988: 64), through which the spokesperson is presented as an individual without personal interest who is only there to interpret the interests of citizens. The second process is the specialization of and compensation for
these tasks. To make a living from politics, it is essential that the work pays; that is, that it provides a livelihood for agents and groups for whom it is the principle source of income. Only in this way can employment in public office be guaranteed to those with limited economic resources who are not part of the social and financial elite, which did not occur under the government of the notables.

Analysis of the multiple forms of political representation and the political profession that have unfolded over time enables an understanding of the transformations in the relational networks that provided different forms of access to public offices at different moments in history, delimiting different figures. We therefore privilege an analysis over a relatively broad historical time-frame, divided into three periods: that of the figure of the council member belonging to the elite, the result of an oligarchical relational configuration; that of the figure of the council member associated with local party cadres, a product of the coordination of local demands and the construction of local party representation; and the figure of the council member as a professional political cadre, associated with access to office by marginal or discredited political figures, which was the consequence of Argentina’s precarious party system.

This periodization focuses on three of the concepts most frequently visited by those with an interest in the study of individuals who occupy elected public office: elite, professional, and cadre. Our approach to these terms differs from those that regard them as mere terminological distinctions associated with a choice of vocabulary and without concrete implications for the analytical perspective, which is often based on an aggregate analysis of educational, social, political, or professional data pertaining to the universe studied. Each term allows the description and analysis of a specific relational context that conditions a particular means of configuring the political profession: the term “elite,” indicating the formation of homogeneous social and cultural groups, constituted through common socialization spaces; the term “cadre,” denoting the creation of groups based on organizational loyalty and identification; and the term “professional,” which refers to the shaping of a space based on expertise and political representation manifested through the formation of multiple, socially recognized and remunerated jobs and tasks. These three relational configurations are not mutually exclusive; rather, in many cases there is articulation in-between them. It is not only important not to use these terms

4. The terminological differences have been a constant and remain so through to the present. Though the literature is extensive, for an overview of the different perspectives, cf. Genieys (2005); Gaxie (1973); Offerlé (1999); Chevalier (1996); Czudowski (1983); Eldersveld et al. (1995); Grynszpan and Hautbergue (1999).

5. For a more in-depth treatment of these differing theoretical perspectives, cf. Landau (2013b).
as synonyms but also to avoid the presupposition that they exist in any particular space or time. Rather than starting off by discussing the existence of cadres, professionals or elites per se, a more fruitful approach would be consider their establishment, and even their eventual disappearance. This gives rise to the need for a historical approach as the only means of explaining the changes in the dynamics of the institutions of primary and secondary socialization, the processes of institutional formation and transformation; and the developmental dynamics of political and professional fields.

THE ELITE COUNCIL MEMBERS

After the federalization of Buenos Aires in 1880, between 1881 and 1882, the Argentine National Congress debated and ratified Law 1260, the Municipal Organic Law (Ley 1260, Ley Orgánica Municipal), which from then on would structure – albeit with a number of subsequent amendments – the institutional structure of the city, the Federal Capital of the Argentine Republic, until it acquired autonomous status in 1996. However, the 1853 political constitution prescribed a limit on possible institutional structures, because Article 86 established that the president is the “chief local authority of the capital of the Nation,” and Article 64, Section 27 stipulated that the Congress exercises “exclusive legislative power throughout the entire territory of the capital of the nation.” It did not make explicit reference to the means of organizing the municipal system, however. The question of how to balance local and national powers dominated debate when the organic law was ratified. The solution was to create a municipal government controlled by an executive branch, whose head would be directly appointed by the president, and a popularly elected legislature. Thus, the coexistence of an executive department headed up by a presidentially-appointed mayor, and a City Council made up of 30 popularly elected members was decided upon.

From the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th, the City Council established itself as very elite institution, in keeping with how its members were selected and their relationship with city residents. The structuring of the legislative branch was borne out of the principles of 19th-century thinking on municipalities, which was based on a “naturalistic” conception of the municipality: that the city was a logical offshoot of the association arising from neighborly relations. Unlike in Aristotelean thought, this natural association was not a political community, but an economic one, as posited by the physiocratic school, which

6. Translation by Apuntes.
7. Translation by Apuntes.
held that the municipality was comprised of a group that included only property owners rather than all inhabitants.\(^9\)

The distinction between “vecinos”\(^{10}\) (understood as those who had the right to vote) and mere inhabitants of the city (those who did not have access to this right) is established on the basis of the tax contribution that inhabitants made or did not make to the municipality. It was because of this distinction that the “Municipal Organic Law” imposed the criteria that only educated people and community leaders would be eligible for council membership, and that they had to pay a direct tax to the municipality, commercial or industrial, or to practice a liberal profession. Meanwhile, foreign nationals were entitled to seek election if they paid a duty “of more than one hundred pesos.” The conditions placed upon the electorate were stricter still and thus excluded the poorest social classes. As Guy Bourdé points out, “[in 1890, for example, out of a population of almost 500,000 people, 6,754 voters were registered on the lists and only 4,034 individuals voted, which accounts for only 0.01% of the population!]” (Bourdé 1974: 99).\(^{11}\)

Hilda Sábato (1998) analyzed how, between 1862 and 1880, elections in Buenos Aires excited passions that did not always preclude physical violence. This changed following the establishment of the restricted municipal vote, at least as far as local elections were concerned. Popular passions, in any event, were exercised through street demonstrations (Rojkind 2012). Census suffrage resulted not only in voter registration lists which included an extremely low proportion of the population, but also led to limited interest in participation in municipal elections. In 1883, when the first elections were held following the introduction of the new organic law, the newspaper La Nación lamented that “an unfortunately large number of taxpayers have neglected the right to register on the electoral roll, thus rendering them unable to exercise their vote [...]. Today’s election will thus not be a true reflection of the aspirations of the municipality.”\(^{12}\) That is, the elections were notable not only for the absence of those who were prohibited from participating, but also of those who could vote but did not.

This apathy can be attributed to the fact that many members of the elite opted to exercise their class sociability by participating in clubs, such as the Jockey Club or the Círculo de

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9. For an in-depth analysis of conceptions of the municipality in Argentina in the second half of the 19th century, see Ternavasio (1993).
10. Translator’s note: vecino is a term that was used in Argentina and elsewhere in South America to describe members of elites in any given geographical area. Elites also used the word to describe themselves. The term conveyed a sharp social distinction between vecinos and others.
11. Translation by Apuntes.
Armas, or through cultural practices, such as attending classical music concerts or horse races. These social practices were associated with a lifestyle change on the part of the western bourgeoisie, who sought to establish themselves as a “distinguished” class (Losada 2007) by eliminating or concealing political disputes. The eradication of political practices was associated with the notion that “civilized” coexistence should lead to the consensual resolution of matters of common interest. Losada recounts the unease felt by Miguel Cané when, from Europe, he found out about a conflict related to the election of Jockey Club authorities. In a letter to his son, who belonged to one of the quarreling groups, he said that nothing had upset him more than these incidents, “due to the intrusion of politics into the affairs of home”\(^\text{13}\) (Losada 2007: 3). This is not to say that those who opted to take part in municipal affairs did so as a consequence of a political vocation; rather, it was seen as another way of encouraging and channeling the participation of affluent sectors of Buenos Aires society in the affairs of “their” city. It should not be forgotten that in the late 19th century it was common for the elites to distinguish between political affairs, which were a matter for the national authorities alone since they represented popular sovereignty, and local affairs, which addressed the common civil affairs of “vecinos-taxpayers.” As such, there was little difference between how these elites conceived of and exercised the governance of their clubs and of “their” city, both were conceived of as domestic, and thus not political, spaces.

A review of some of the most significant characteristics of elected council members in 1883 allows us to identify those who were inclined towards municipal public life. Included among those who acceded to office were members of the *criollo* aristocracy, such as future mayor Torcuato de Alvear, son of General Carlos M. Alvear, who had not occupied any public office of note, save for his appointment as commissioner of the Municipal Commission that was then existed; or Reynaldo Parravicini, a descendant of bishops and cardinals, who was in charge of the National Penitentiary. Also noteworthy are a number of *haciendados*, such as Melitón Espinosa, who went on to found a village on his land in Santa Fe; or Manuel Cadret, a tannery owner of French parentage and one of the first members of the Jockey Club and patron of the Teatro Colón, who also founded a village on farmland he owned in the province of Buenos Aires. There were also members of professional renown, such as Antonio de P. Aleu, a newspaperman of Catalan origins; or Otto Recke, a well-regarded pharmacist based in Corrientes y Cerrito, who defeated none other than Domingo F. Sarmiento in the elections. With few exceptions, these professionals did not pursue lengthy political careers. This attests to the nature of the office of the council member, which was more associated with social recognition than the professionalization of politics.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, although they did

\(^{13}\) Translation by Apuntes. Translator’s note: in Spanish, the writer refers to “asuntos de la casa.”

\(^{14}\) For an inquiry into all of the elected members, cf. Bucich Escobar (1937: 146).
not form a majority in the council, the presence of foreign nationals was significant. In a Buenos Aires in which half of the inhabitants were immigrants who were not allowed to vote in national elections, access to municipal seats was an opportunity for better-off foreign nationals to achieve social recognition and make connections with the criollo elites.

According to the 1882 law, the City Council was to be composed of representatives of each electoral district. The term of office was two years, renewed each year through elections at the end of November. Unlike the office of mayor, the law did not provide for remuneration for council members; rather, it was considered an ad honorem public post, incompatible with any paid national, provincial, or municipal office. As pointed out by Mario Rapoport and Maria Seoane, “the conservative regime was on full display in Buenos Aires: an electoral system that was practically uninominal that restricted access by minorities to the city’s chamber of representatives. Members were required to exercise public office ad honorem, which reserved the public sphere to men of money” (Rapoport and Seoane 2007: 70).

Electoral procedures also go some way towards explaining the elitist character of the figure of the council member during this period. Voting, which took place in the vestibules of parish churches or at offices of justices of the peace, was supposed to secret. In some cases, the approach taken to settling matters was somewhat opaque and came about through party arrangements (Rapoport and Seoane 2007). However, this did not mean that intense campaigning did not occur in the run up to elections and, much of the time, candidates campaigned in each one of the parishes. However, the purpose of this activity was to give recognition to the same elitist circles who voted and were voted for, given that popular sectors could not particulate in the contest.

As a consequence of being debarred from participating in the municipal vote, low-income groups had a strong presence in other forms of participation through a highly active network of civil associations. Indeed, the establishment of union, mutual, and neighborhood associations allowed underprivileged classes to form bonds of group solidarity, and to institutionalize demands made to municipal authorities. Though these were still very precarious at the end of the century, they increased in intensity in the years that followed.

In short, the figure of the elite council member is not associated with the absolute nonexistence of a relationship between the governing and the governed, but with a specific configuration of relations in which the former have the possibility of acting without need

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15. The 1887 census determined that Buenos Aires had a population of 433,375, of which 52.7% were foreign nationals.
to factor in the above-mentioned "oligarchy" game model. The elite council members were not "representatives" of the city's inhabitants; rather, they were part of a self-representation game that arose out of the conception of collegial government of the "common" affairs of vecinos. To be sure, they represented their own interests, not those of others.

Although the City Council was an elitist institution, its members were elected. This could not be said for the institution that time and time again acted in place of the council in the face of some eventuality or deadlock: the Commission of Honorable Vecinos (Comisión de Vecinos Honorables), as the group of individuals belonging to Buenos Aires' social elite was known, was assigned to attend to the affairs of the city at the wish of the executive branch of the national government or the president and without any popular participation. In the years that followed the federalization of the city, these vecinos' commissions were as significant as the City Council. Between 1883 and the reform of 1917, the council was taken over three times: 1885-1890, 1901-1908 and 1915-1918. In each of these cases, the justification for the measure was based on the idea that the city government nonetheless remained in the hands of its most illustrious, responsible, and learned vecinos. The profile of the commissioners did not differ too much from that of the council members, in that they were eminent members of the Buenos Aires elite and, in some cases, ex-council members who continued to exercise their roles by direct appointment by the executive. This was the case of Antonio de P. Aleu, Manuel Cadret, Eduardo Hammer, Domingo Parodi, and Pedro Montaña. Evidently, it had more to do with establishing a group that was in tune with the municipal and national executive authorities than with changing the social profile of the legislators.

FROM SOCIAL ELITES TO LOCAL PARTY CADRES

The development of Argentina's first modern political parties and ideas was initiated at the beginning of the 20th century. This ushered in a process of political professionalization by allowing certain individuals not only to live for politics, but to live off it as well, as Weber (1991) put it. The epicenters of this process were the large urban centers, especially Buenos Aires, where the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical - UCR) and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) prospered. In 1916, after the first universal, secret, and obligatory vote took place on a national level for the first time, the radical candidate Hipólito Yrigoyen was elected president. In this context, there was mounting criticism of the way that the capital of the country was governed. The elitist character of those who held office in the local government legislature was undoubtedly one of the points most often made by those sectors that fought for the democratization of local elections. This eventually occurred with the reform of the Organic Municipal Law in 1917.
The UCR and the PS, which from the beginning of the 20th century had engaged in intense political activity in the neighborhoods created through urban development, stressed the need to reorganize municipal institutions to fit a reality that could no longer be approached on the basis of elitist criteria. The socialists, who achieved one of their fundamental aims with the municipal electoral reform,\(^{17}\) did not tire of inveighing through all possible channels against the anachronism of certain terms, such as “honorable vecinos” or “distinguished vecinos,” which could only be read as euphemisms that legitimized an elitist government associated with an antiquated and unfair form of ruling the city. At a meeting of the City Council, Juan B. Justo stated that:

The executive branch tells us that it has appointed a commission of “honorable vecinos.” For us, the socialist deputies, the presumption must be, especially among those who govern, that all vecinos are honorable, except for those who are in jail [laughter]. It then stresses [...] that it takes recourse to the appointment of a commission of “distinguished vecinos”; that is, individuals residing in the parish of Socorro\(^{18}\) […], as all of them live in that district. Is it possible that of the 22 appointed individuals, not one has ventured beyond the Plaza Constitución, where they take the train to Mar del Plata. I doubt that there is even one of them that has given over a quarter of an hour’s thought to a study of the price of meat or bread? [laughter]. (Honorable Concejo Deliberante 1938: 232-233).\(^{19}\)

Juan B. Justo’s sarcasm provides a glimpse into the criticism of the way the city government was organized, i.e. in such a manner that those who held public office were completely detached from the problems experienced by the population. Without question, it is the configuration of the “oligarchy game” described by Elias that is being called into question. Instead of a government by the self-representing few at the expense of the many, the need to establish a system of representation was put forwarded and conceived of as the only possible means of solving the problems of the least privileged classes. The argument expounded most frequently by those in favor of electoral reform was that only popular participation would allow public authorities to act on urban issues in a way that would ensure equal treatment for wealthy and poor neighborhoods. For those who championed universal suffrage, this measure would assure policies that did not respond only to the interests of a single faction, but to those of the entire city and its inhabitants.

\(^{17}\) In one of his famous legislative interventions, Mario Bravo suggested that universal municipal suffrage was part of the PS platform, which was socialist from the outset (cf. Recopilación de los debates de leyes orgánicas municipales y sus textos definitivos (Honorable Concejo Deliberativo 1938: 195; also see his complete speeches in Bravo (1917).

\(^{18}\) Located in the north of the city, where the high-income sectors lived.

\(^{19}\) Translation by Apuntes.
The reform of the 1917 "Municipal Organic Law" introduced the universal male vote and, thereby, a new dynamic in the organization of the public and institutional life of the city, which would lead to the decline of the elite council members. Nonetheless, the mayor would continue to be appointed by the president for another eighty years. The election of council members by district was replaced by a single district system in which seats were proportionally divided among all parties that had received votes, with no pre-established minimum. Universal male suffrage dealt a blow to governance by the social elites, who retreated further into their private clubs and circles of sociability. Thus, the City Council had distanced itself from the social elites by an additional two steps. On the one hand, the entrance of the new "parties of ideas" that monopolized the council seats, such as the UCR and the PS, resulted in the abandonment of the notion that being a member of the council was associated with the administration of "domestic" affairs. On the other hand, the newly-acquired complexity of government responsibilities, increasingly technical and bureaucratic as they were, prompted the elites to shun public office, which they increasingly regarded as trivial in comparison with the lofty concerns of the "liberators" and "constitutional assembly delegates" who were their predecessors (Losada 2007: 14).

After the electoral reform, a relatively stable party system was built around the UCR and the PS, a specific means of structuring the representative bond was organized, and local legislative responsibilities were professionalized. All of this led to a modification of the figure of the council member, who went from being a member of the elite to a local party cadre. This was the product of a "democratization" process, in Elias' terms, which took place in Buenos Aires during the interwar period. By then the public life of the city had become more complex and there were concerns about the need to respond to the social demands of disadvantaged sections of society. This led to a transformation in the ways in which the disadvantaged sectors of the population were associated with social and political participation. For example, the 1920s and 1930s were instrumental in the formation of neighborhood associations, local institutions through which residents in each part of the city conveyed their demands to political officials (Walter 1974); these bodies purported to be "apolitical," holding true to a very deep-rooted conception of relations in the city as being detached from the political struggle. During this period, the UCR and the PS grew through the establishment of a territorial presence, which involved the creation of committees and other local institutions through which new members were recruited. There was overlap between these two processes, as the same individuals were often members of both the associations and the parties. In some cases, associations that claimed to be apolitical had links with political parties, and especially with the UCR (Horowitz 1999: 574).

Activities in each neighborhood provided the political parties with key leaders in a process in which mediation of social demands and the struggles for representation of parts of the city were linked. There is a notable tendency in some of the literature on the period to decouple these two processes, with opposing analyses applied to each. On the one hand, the activities of the neighborhood associations are idealized, with attempts to discern "nests of democracy" in which "opinions were expressed – the practice of speaking at a meeting or an assembly – and others were listened to; there was disagreement, agreement were reached, and participants learned to respect differences"\(^{21}\) (Gutiérrez and Romero 1995: 161). On the other hand, there is criticism of the practices of exchanging material and symbolic goods between neighborhood leaders and the vecinos, with the former labeled as "punteros" (local political brokers) or "patrons," in keeping with "clientelistic" practice (Horowitz 1999). However, these two processes cannot be disassociated as they are both part of the same relational configuration, founded on the creation of a local political field with its specific habitus, which linked collective activities and local representational efforts and determined the strategies of the agents involved in the struggles to become neighborhood spokespeople. These dynamics commenced as soon as the new law was put into practice, which allows us to understand why almost all candidates for council seats came from neighborhood participative politics.\(^{22}\)

The political parties, especially the UCR, selected candidates from among the most respected leaders from each neighborhood. Participation in committees was the first step in a career in politics, followed by election to the City Council, and, eventually, becoming a congressional deputy. Though not everyone who held office as a council member went on to pursue a national political career, there were many who did. Over the period 1919-1930, the socialists had 16 congressional deputies who had previously held office as council members, while the radicals had nine and the conservatives had one. Of this total of 26, only one first held national office and then local office, which shows that serving as a council member was a stepping stone for those with aspirations of pursuing a subsequent political career (Walter 1993: 181-182). As a result, intense struggles for control of committees was one of the most significant features of those years. It was not possible to gain recognition as a local leader without addressing local demands, which were in the hands of neighborhood associations. Thus, recognition as a social leader of a particular neighborhood association was often regarded as a necessary means of gaining support before entering the party fray and finally going on to win a place on the lists of candidates.

\(^{21}\) Translation by Apuntes.

\(^{22}\) This process was possible because, alongside the creation of local representation through the selection of City Council candidates, a government recognition process for the neighborhood associations was set up. Because of issues of space and the line of argument, the second process will not be discussed in any depth here.
This particular form of configuring relations also demarcated the most significant features of the figure of the council member on acceding to office. Those who sat on the City Council officiated as mediators between the demands of their local followers and party goals. This occurred not only in the case of the better organized parties – the few cases of successful local political careers outside the majority parties, such as that of council member José Penélón, were based on lasting articulation with local interests. The career of this council member is an emblematic case of how local demands and elected offices were articulated, even outside the largest parties. A long-time cadre of the Communist Party, he took exception to the need for articulation with the local neighborhood associations. This earned him an expulsion from the party in 1927, prompting him to form his own political group. He won a council seat on a number of occasions thanks to the votes of the local associations that answered to him. This was possible, among other things, due to proportionality without a minimum threshold of votes, which provided access to small parties. The council members used their positions to mediate between the demands of the neighborhood associations and the municipal authorities with respect to the principal deficiencies in urban services such as lighting, drainage, road surfacing, and transportation. Even when these requests were not fulfilled, they were part of the prior agreement that corresponded to the nature of the bond established. But in addition to this kind of mediation, the council members operated as a bridge for attaining public sector employment in a municipality that was expanding rapidly, with the pace of staff expansion outstripping that of other big-city municipalities and the population growth of Buenos Aires (Horowitz 1999).

The emergence of local party cadres not only resulted in an increase in administrative staff working in the executive branch of the city government (Walter 1993), but also affected the make-up of the City Council between 1918 and 1941; by then the council was led by socialist and radical members, except for the years in which the UCR abstained from participating in elections. Save for a few cases associated with the presence of union or sectoral representatives that thrived during the abstention of the radicals – such as that of the "theater people" ("gente del teatro) which won a seat for a popular actor of the day, Florencio Parravicini (González Velasco 2007) - it was the local party cadres who took the council seats. The relative stability of the Buenos Aires political system in those years is easily understood, as party membership was the fastest route to securing a seat on the City Council. But even though this was the case, the same party representatives approached their responsibilities on the basis of an ambivalent logic in which they sought to reconcile their party membership with the still very marked and widespread notion that solutions to the city’s problems could come from actions that put “political” differences to one side in order to reach consensus on social policies.
In 1993, soon after the consolidation of the figure of the local party cadre, the position of councilperson was professionalized through an amendment to the “Organic Municipal Law,” which established an allowance for occupying a council seat. In the decade and a half that separated the universalization of municipal suffrage and the introduction of payment for council members, a number of political and academic actors proposed changes that would do away with the ad honorem spirit of the law, which was seen as being a highly elitist and unprofessional relic of a bygone age. For example, in the Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas, in 1925, Eduardo Mangione proposed:

On establishing the cost-free and public duty status of the public office, the law had in mind a municipal era and a social situation completely different than that which currently exists. It assumed that in the calm and modest city, there existed a group of men with inheritances or retired from business who, in amiable gatherings on certain evenings during the week, spontaneously contributed their goodwill to the service of communal interests, those that were considered the most able and the most interested due to their being the highest ratepayers. [...] It is no longer a matter of resolving, through friendly conversation, matters relating to city sanitation, alignment, and adornment, which are beneficial to the wellbeing and convenience of the vecinos. These are complex problems and essential interests that affect the very organization of life. [...] Given how things are on the ground – exactly – that the conscientious performance of the responsibilities of a council member is demanding and irreconcilable with all other forms of private employment without impairment to the sound performance of mandate conferred, to maintain that those who do not have other sources of income are not able to hold office amounts to closing the doors of the council to all young men without means or fortunes but with civic aspirations, contrary to the express intentions of the law which, on abolishing the requirement to be a ratepayer for eligibility and of qualifications for voting, clearly had the purpose of genuinely opening the doors of the municipal government to all men from all parties, voluntarily canceling the previous privilege. (Mangione 1925: 15)

The introduction of an allowance for the office of council member starting in 1933 was a significant event that left the figure of the elite council member behind for good, legitimizing the material needs of representatives who aspired to make politics their permanent source of income. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that the council members would have received

23. Chapter 1, Article 2 of Law 11740 (September 28, 1933), which amended Law 10240, was worded as follows: “The roles of City Council members are considered to be public duties from which no-one can be excused under penalty of a fine of five-hundred pesos. The council members are nonetheless entitled to payment drawn from the corresponding budget, which cannot be increased for members during their terms of office.” Translation by Apuntes.

24. Translation by Apuntes.
some returns on their position in the decade and a half in question, even though the office was unpaid; these may have been for their mediation in obtaining urban goods and services, for procedures related to access to employment, or from party allowances. The party networks and their professional activities probably allowed council members to obtain the resources necessary to hold the office so long as its ad honorem status lasted.

In any case, despite the fact that it took fifteen years to develop a new way of structuring the dispute over public offices in the city of Buenos Aires through the universalization of suffrage, the presence of the “parties of ideas,” and the professionalization of the post of council member through the introduction of an allowance, we should not lose sight of the fact that, in historical terms, this was not a prolonged period. Indeed, what was most significant was that in this brief lapse of time, Buenos Aires went from being a restrictive government, without popular participation and commanded by its elites free of charge, to one that was universal, where political debate and struggles for office came to be dictated by the customary patterns of modern political parties. In other words, in a short period of time, the “domestic” conception of city government was shelved for good, to be replaced by a more complex perspective that saw the city as a social body and its government as a space for the technical resolution of urban problems. Moreover, one can venture to say that it was the rapid development of local party cadres that legitimized the need for professionalization in such a limited time-frame, culminating in their provision with an allowance for exercising office as council members. Accordingly, by the 1930s, Buenos Aires council members had acquired the main features that characterize officeholders in modern political systems: party membership, structuring of the representative bond with the governed, and payment for their work.

PROFESSIONAL POLITICAL CADRES AND THEIR LOSS OF PRESTIGE

Historically, it can be seen that it was perhaps between 1918 and 1941 when a degree of stabilization in the democratic system of representation and delegation was established; this came about through the emergence of a municipal political field with a particular habitus based on the complementarity of associative and party practices, and was boosted by the professionalization of the office in 1933. In those years, the electors and the elected participated in the system of representation and delegation with some consistency; local demands and struggles were mediated through a relatively stable political and institutional system, even when during the period there were moments, such as the celebrated Chade affaire, when the relationship between political parties and neighborhood associations became strained (see De Privitellio 2003). In these terms, the local party cadre was a central figure who organized political identities and memberships into relatively durable loyalties whereby joining a party was the gateway to living off politics. Organizational
dynamics were central to this context, as they formed the basis of the formation of groups of leaders founded on party identification and loyalty. This was the case because the city had witnessed the break-up of the elitist arrangement in which legitimacy for holding public office was a direct function of class membership, and prospects of access were dependent on class credentials acquired through primary socialization.

This arrangement was not to last. In 1941 president Ramón Castillo took control of the City Council and soon after, in 1946, Perón did away with it entirely and structured the government of the federal capital around a presidentially-appointed mayor. For Peronism, the government of Buenos Aires was no more than a vehicle for the technical and administrative fulfillment of the president’s will, and all forms of autonomous political life were to be cast aside. The elimination of the City Council was based on criticism of how it had operated previously. A piece entitled “La nueva capital de la nueva Argentina” (The new capital of the new Argentina), published in the party newspaper Mundo Peronista, illustrated this position:

Did you ever hear of the honorable members doing anything for the working people who live in the poor neighborhoods? You didn’t, did you? [...] That’s why I’m happy that there are no more council members. And that’s also why I’m happy that General Perón is leading the government of the city of Buenos Aires. Perón delivers! Because Perón is the only ruler of the city of Buenos Aires who knew and knows how to govern for all. For us too, [for] us workers who live in the poor neighborhoods! (Mundo Peronista 1951: 10)

This quote reflects criticism of how local party cadres had associated with the now-overlooked vecinos of the city, which was at the heart of the bond created in postwar Buenos Aires. The solution proposed was not to recast the figure of the council member as had occurred following the 1917 reform, but to eliminate it entirely, reorganizing the city government based on a direct delegation relationship between the vecinos and the president. In this context, the local party cadres lost the leverage they had previously possessed. The personalization of the social, which characterized the Peronist government of the city, served to break up the previous relational configuration. This led to the fragmentation of participation in the neighborhood associations and local committees that had influenced the way that the City Council functioned. Instead, demands were channeled directly to national or municipal executive authorities, though the latter only acted as intermediaries to the former (Acha 2004).

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25. Translation by Apuntes.
26. For more on the government of the city of Buenos Aires during the first Peronist government and, specifically, the process of personalizing the social, see Landau (2013a).
Ricardo Sidicaro has defined the period in Argentina between the first coup d’etat in 1930 and the final return of democratic government in 1983 as a “military republic in which different military elites retained prominent positions in the national political dynamic, whether by occupying high office or selecting and/or training successors who they would later remove from government by means of a new coup” (Sidicaro 2013: 22). Taking his lead from Irving Horowitz, Sidicaro contends that during that half century a “norm of illegitimacy” (Horowitz 1968) restructured beliefs “which implied that the legitimacy of the rulers arose out of the results of their economic or social policies, playing down the means of achieving office that were illegitimate in legal terms as well as actions or omissions that infringed upon constitutional norms” (Sidicaro 2013: 23).

In this context, characterized by continuous coups d’etat, political representation and the profession of politics became precarious because of the institutional instability that nullified the possibility of achieving a permanent source of income by being a politician, and, essentially, because of an incapacity to construct and maintain the theatricality of representation and delegation in the democratic game.

Sidicaro’s analysis of the situation in Argentina as a whole allows us to frame and understand the case of Buenos Aires. The City Council of Buenos Aires operated for only 14 of the 38 years that this period lasted. In 1958, following the 1955 coup d’etat against Juan D. Perón, the municipal institutions established by Law 10240 were restored. When elections were called for the first time in sixteen years, it was proposed that the municipal institutions should not simply respond to technical and administrative criteria or act as a mere executing arm of policies decided on the national level; rather, they had to represent the interests of “society” or the “people” of the city through electoral mechanisms. But the situation in Buenos Aires in 1958 was totally different to that of 1941, just as the social, political, and institutional reality of the late 1950s could not be compared to that of the early 1940s.

Buenos Aires had become a metropolitan city and had grown far beyond its jurisdictional limits to become “Greater Buenos Aires.” Because of these changes, even though the “neighborhoods” had not stopped being spheres of social and political sociability, other less territorialized forms of belonging gained in importance, such as professional, union, or student associations. This was accompanied by the loss of the centrality of the neighborhood associations, catalyzed by the scant attention afforded them by Peronism. As for the political situation, in the late 1950s rank-and-file Peronists held secret gatherings to organize the “resistance” and secure the return of Perón, while the remaining parties, the
UCR in particular, continued with the local committees but no longer coordinated with the neighborhood associations that were pivotal to the local political cadres. As regards the institutional situation, changes had been made to the way elections were held. Until 1932, local debate had always been prioritized as part of elections, but after that date municipal elections were never again held on different dates than national elections. This, obviously, led to a loss of interest in municipal elections, as they were relegated by the election of congressional deputies, senators, or the president and their content was "nationalized."

Between 1958 and 1973 there were only six elections in which council members were elected for the total or partial renewal of the City Council; three of these - 1958, 1963, and 1973 - coincided with presidential, congressional, and senate elections, while the other three - 1960, 1962 and 1965 - with congressional elections alone.

This situation made it impossible to modernize the figure of the local political cadre, who had developed a specific means of organizing the bond between local legislative representatives, political parties, local institutions, and the vecinos of the city. Although the local leaders that each party worked with did not disappear, the paths to candidacies no longer hinged on coordination with neighborhood associations or local social organizations. Rather, from the end of the 1960s, it was intraparty power struggles and alliances with professional or union sectors that secured access to seats. The figure of the council member was structured, in this context, as a professional political cadre, fundamentally Peronist or radical. However, this configuration, unlike the two that came before it, did not achieve stability. The legitimization of the figure of the elite council member was associated with his class background, from which the presumed suitability for municipal affairs arose; and acceptance of local party cadres was based on the singularity of the bond created. This enabled the construction of a relationship of representation that included the neighborhood practices and sociabilities in the municipal political game and, later, legitimization of the council member's office as a result of professionalization.

Rosanvallon (2006) analyzed the constitutive ambivalence of modern representative systems; this ambivalence plays out through the need to structure the bond between the representatives and the represented based on a relationship of reoccurring trust and distrust with respect to the electorate's perception of its political authorities. Even though distrust is part of the system, its form and the extent are not always the same. While the theatricality of the game of representation works, it is channeled as a form of control but not an all-out confrontation with authorities. In these terms, despite believing that politics should be monitored, the electorate tends to accept, and even to defend, the principle that politicians should live off their positions. When this is not the case, distrust proliferates, as the discreet charm of representation weakens and those who seek to present themselves as the personification of the people's interests are crudely perceived by the electorate.
as individuals with personal strategies and political positioning in order to earn money, whether by legitimate or illegitimate means. This appears to have been the case of the Buenos Aires council members: when the previous form of structuring the representative bond disappeared with the decline of the local party cadres, the figure of the council member was no more than a professional politician whose sole ambition was to obtain a position that would allow him to live off politics, in the style of the job hunters without party ideologies described by Weber (1991). When the council member was stripped of the "local and "apolitical" characteristics that allowed him to maintain a relative level of approval in the 1920s and 1930s, and directly associated with political interests and personal ambitions, the council member increasingly acquired the image of a gray, nontransparent figure detached from the needs and interests of the city.

Perhaps the only brief period during which this loss of prestige abated was in the first few years that followed the return to democracy in 1983. Between 1983 and 1987 the radicals had a substantial majority on the City Council, which meant that ordinances could be approved with little difficulty and in tune with municipal and national public management. Moreover, the country was experiencing something new, having again put its faith in a democratic regime, without constraints, in which the main political parties, the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista, PJ) and the UCR, legitimately contested clean elections. However, this situation was not to last. After the 1987 elections, radicalism lost its simple majority in the City Council (and in the National Congress), which led to large-scale conflicts that had effects on the election of authorities to the City Council and on the ratification of ordinances. If, on the national level, personalism began to emerge in the various political parties of the 1990s, on the local level, it grew in strength and the City Council was the subject of recurring accusations of inefficiency and corruption. Thus, most drafts to reform the Municipal Organic Law that were debated from the end of the 1980s included proposals for changes to the City Council. Apart from the heart of the issue, the City Council had become a symbol of the two great ills to be fought: corruption and excessive government expansion. Perhaps for this reason, once the city had attained its autonomy, one of the first objectives was to eliminate the institution and the office of council member, and to replace them with the legislature of the City of Buenos Aires and the office of city deputy.

FINAL REFLECTIONS: ONE WORD, VARIOUS MEANINGS

The literature that focuses on the characteristics of the political teams warns of the ever-present risk that is run when a specific feature is interpreted in a categorical manner. For example, being a lawyer in the 18th century meant something quite different to being...  

30. On this topic, see: Carnota and Talpone (1995); Reato (1996).
one at the end of the 20th century. To understand a meaning, it is necessary to read it in the context of the historical era to which it belongs. This complicates the work of those who attempt to demarcate the transformations of a particular group by analyzing, for instance, the changes to the most common professions from one historical period to another. For a true comparison it is not sufficient just to establish whether there are more or less lawyers than before; rather, the meaning of being a lawyer, which varies over time, must be determined.

Even allowing for this more complex comparison, it is still not enough to focus solely on the shifts in meaning of a given attribute pertaining to the individuals under analysis. Transformations in meaning do not only apply to the attributes or characteristics of individuals who are part of the same group, but to the meaning of the group per se. In these pages, I have endeavored to develop this idea by tracing the figure of the council member throughout the history of the government of the city of Buenos Aires. The group is no more than a product of a specific relational configuration and to understand its meaning it is necessary to open up the analysis to the multiple dimensions of which it is comprised. In the case of the office of the city council member, this is not possible without perceiving the institutional, social, and political changes from which it undoubtedly derives.

The concepts of elites, professionals, and cadres allows for a rapid and accurate circumscription of a range of relational configurations that are formed on the basis of varied relational networks. The council members were elites when they joined together as a homogeneous social and cultural group through common sociability spaces. This was only possible at a time when the distance from popular sectors, which were detached from municipal political life, was immense and when governing the city was a matter of simply addressing the civil affairs of the “vecinos.” The transformations that came about at beginning of the 20th century, with the sudden appearance of popular sectors on the political scene as a result of the increasing population and urbanization of the city, led to a progressive “de-elitization” of the figure of the council member. Consequently, the role played by the local cadres of the main political parties, such as the PS or the UCR, was crucial. Institutional socialization based on the creation of spaces of local identification and loyalty had central implications, given that it enabled the construction of a fiction of representation between the member and the neighborhood, which guaranteed a degree of stability and continuity in the sphere of local politics between 1918 and 1941. This creation of local party cadres was complimented by the introduction of remuneration for the office of council member, institutionalized through the transition from being an ad honorem to a paid position. Nonetheless, the council members were more local party cadres than political professionals. In any case, their links to their neighborhoods allowed them to join the ranks
of those who were considered eligible to be council members in order to obtain material and symbolic benefits, both for themselves and for their adherents.

The period 1918–1941 was perhaps the time when local “democracy” worked, if by this we understand a predictable system of access to office, a means of constructing the fiction of representation between the representatives and the represented, and the formation of a municipal political space. The four decades that separate the overthrow of Perón in 1955 from the city’s acquisition of autonomy in 1996 witnessed recurring instability, a product not only of the characteristics of the municipality but of the conditions that were established on the national level. In a country in which the “military republic” governed, as Sidicaro (2013) puts it, and where the formation of a stable political field was not possible, the council members did not have very much scope to establish themselves as a group of relevance. This helped ensure that the paths to the municipal council remained in the hands of political parties and that only figures of limited significance had access. Thus, it contributed to the council members’ gradual loss of prestige, which peaked in the years that preceded the city’s acquisition of autonomy status.
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