The effective collaboration and free competition: INDECOPI caught in the prisoner's dilemma
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21678/forseti.v1i1.1193Keywords:
clemency, orders, indecopi, conduct, collusive, behaviourAbstract
In this paper, Professor Cecilia O'Neill discusses the regulation of clemency orders (effective collaboration) in the Peruvian rule regarding repression of anticompetitive conduct related to infringements of free competition. She argues that these programs have taken a step forward, but there are still things to improve in order to make more effective the control of collusive behavior.
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Published
2019-10-14
How to Cite
O’neill de la Fuente, C. (2019). The effective collaboration and free competition: INDECOPI caught in the prisoner’s dilemma. Forseti. Law Review, 1(1), 30–91. https://doi.org/10.21678/forseti.v1i1.1193
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