Governance in Times of Minority: Coalitions, Fragmentation and the Legislative Branch in Contemporary Peru

Abstract

This article analyzes the evolution of relations between the executive and legislative branches in Peru between 2001 and 2022 in a context marked by the low institutionalization of the party system, parliamentary fragmentation, and a presidential form of government with parliamentary features. Based on a qualitative-descriptive methodological strategy and the use of legislative and partisan indicators, three distinct stages were identified in that period: an initial stage of relative cooperation (2001-2011), a stage of growing presidential isolation (2011-2016) and a final stage of open confrontation between powers (2016-2022), characterized by governmental instability and various constitutional crises.

The central hypothesis argues that the Peruvian presidential variant, together with the constant existence of minority governments and scarce democratic commitment on the part of key actors in both branches of government, generated conditions conducive to political deadlock and institutional weakening. The findings allow us to affirm that, although the formal rules were not significantly modified, the political system mutated towards a more conflictive model, in which Congress acquired a leading role, often obstructive, affecting democratic governance.

This study contributes to the debate on the relationship between institutional design, the behavior of the main political actors, and democratic stability in fragmented presidential regimes, especially in the context of weak party institutionalization.